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In recent years, there has been a proliferation of new prod-ucts that enable the early detection of disease, includingnew scanning devices for detecting osteoporosis, genetic
tests for inherited breast cancer risk, and home testing kits for
HIV and colon cancer (see, e.g., Ameghino 1998; Farhan
1996; Gavaghan 1998). Such products not only represent
potential revenue streams for the firms that develop them but
also provide a potential means for achieving two important
but often incompatible societal goals: improving public health
and simultaneously reducing health care costs (see, e.g., Elder
et al. 1994; Reagan 1992). Many of the major killers in an
industrialized society (e.g., high blood pressure, diabetes,
cancer) are insidious diseases, doing much of their damage
before the patient experiences symptoms. If such diseases can
be detected early in their development, they can be treated
much more effectively, saving both lives and money.
However, the success of early detection programs
requires more than new technology. It also requires wide-
spread consumer adoption of screening products, and gain-
ing consumer adoption of these products is a major market-
ing challenge. Despite the many benefits of screening,
consumers are often reluctant to participate in it (see, e.g.,
Andreasen 1995; Elder et al. 1994).
One source of this reluctance appears to be a general
consumer ambivalence toward problem-detection products,
ranging from home radon detection services (Weinstein and
Lyon 1999) to drug testing kits marketed to worried parents
(Snyder 1996). Consumers who do not believe that they are
susceptible to a given problem may question the benefit of
being tested for something they “know” they do not have. In
contrast, consumers who are concerned about having an
underlying problem may have anxiety about the test’s out-
come, making them reluctant to find out whether their fears
are justified (see McCaul et al. 1996). Although the long-
term benefits of early problem detection are often great, the
short-term outcome may be bad news. And many people are
ambivalent about seeking out bad news. While proverbial
wisdom advises that “Forewarned is forearmed” and
“Knowledge is power,” it also advises that “Where igno-
rance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise” and “So long as I know
it not, it hurteth me not” (Simpson 1982).
Consumers’ ambivalence about screening outcomes
raises an important question for advocates of problem-
detection products: In designing messages to persuade con-
sumers to adopt such products, how should potential testing
outcomes be portrayed? In this study, we examine how con-
sumers’ beliefs and attitudes toward screening are affected
by two specific message-design factors: (1) whether screen-
ing consequences are communicated with anecdotal evi-
dence or statistical evidence and (2) whether these conse-
quences are framed in terms of potential losses or potential
gains. Each of these two factors is discussed subsequently.
Conceptual Background
The Effects of Anecdotal Versus Statistical
Evidence
When communicating the potential consequences of a
behavior, promoters can employ either a specific illustrative
anecdote or more general population statistics. For example,
in communicating the benefits of wearing a seat belt, pro-
moters could either tell the story of a specific person whose
life was saved by wearing a seat belt or cite statistics on the
lower accident fatality rates among passengers wearing seat
belts. From an objective standpoint, statistics are generally
more informative than anecdotes (because an isolated anec-
dote can be found to support almost any point of view). How-
ever, research suggests that audiences tend to be more inter-
ested in and influenced by anecdotal than statistical evidence
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(see e.g., Brosius and Bathelt 1994; Hogarth 1980; Taylor
and Thompson 1982). In interpreting these findings, Hogarth
(1980, p. 98) posits that “specific case data are ... encoded
and remembered on several dimensions with a correspond-
ingly rich set of meaningful associations” (see also Shedler
and Manis 1986). In contrast, many subjects seem to “tune
out” abstract generalizations, especially statistical general-
izations. Brosius and Bathelt (1994, p. 50) note the “difficul-
ties people have in processing ... percentages, probability,
and so forth,” and Taylor and Thompson (1982, p. 162) note
subjects’ tendency to “underuse ... statistical information.”
Although anecdotal messages may be more involving
than statistical messages, this does not necessarily mean that
they are more persuasive. Petty and Cacioppo (1981) argue
that involving messages can be either more or less persua-
sive than noninvolving messages, depending on the per-
ceived strength of the arguments contained in these mes-
sages (see also Eagly and Chaiken 1993).
Framing the Consequences of Consumer Health
Decisions
In promotions for any course of action, either the potential
gains from pursuing it or the potential losses from not pur-
suing it can be emphasized. For example, an advertisement
could emphasize either the money gained by mailing in a
rebate or the money lost by not mailing it in. In a series of
experiments involving hypothetical choice situations, Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981) find that people are more likely
to pursue an action when it is framed as a means to avoid a
loss rather than to achieve a gain. According to Tversky and
Kahneman’s “prospect theory,” decision makers are moti-
vated by both losses and gains but tend to give greater deci-
sion weight to potential losses (see also Kanouse 1984).
This is especially true when the consequences of an action
are delayed. Behavioral economists have found that the
decision weight given to a consequence is “discounted as a
function of the delay of its delivery” (Madden 2000, p. 16)
and that future gains tend to be discounted more than future
losses (see, e.g., Simpson and Vuchinich 2000).
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) experiments show the
effects of framing on hypothetical choices, typically
between monetary bets or public policy options. However,
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) extend this research to the
study of consumers’ personal health behavior, specifically
breast self-examination (BSE) behavior among female col-
lege students. Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s
hypothesis, these researchers find that subjects are more
motivated to participate in BSE when messages stress the
potential losses from not performing BSE rather than the
potential gains from performing BSE.
However, when subsequent researchers have examined
the effects of gain versus loss framing in the context of real
consumer health decisions, the results have been mixed.
Some studies have found loss framing more persuasive (e.g.,
Banks et al. 1995; Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987), some
have found gain framing more persuasive (e.g., Rothman et
al. 1993), and still others have found no framing effects at
all (e.g., Lauver and Rubin 1990). These mixed findings
have prompted researchers to search for potential modera-
tors of framing effects.
Message Involvement as a Moderator of Framing
Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990, p. 361) suggest that
framing effects are moderated by subjects’ involvement with
the framed message. Specifically, they posit that “negatively
framed messages should be more persuasive than positively
framed ones when issue involvement is high.” To derive this
hypothesis, the authors integrate Tversky and Kahneman’s
prospect theory with the cognitive response theory of per-
suasion (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1981): Prospect theory
implies that loss-framed arguments will be perceived as
stronger or more compelling than gain-framed messages.
However, cognitive response theory posits that for subjects
to be influenced by argument strength, they must first be
sufficiently involved with message content to evaluate argu-
ment strength. Consistent with this hypothesis, Wright and
Weitz (1977) find that women show a greater aversion to
negative features of birth control devices when purchase is
imminent (which increases motivation to process the infor-
mation) than when purchase will take place in the distant
future. In interpreting these and other findings, Wright
(1981, pp. 279) argues that “overweighting [of negative
information] may only occur when an audience member is
sufficiently concerned over message content to bother gen-
erating reactions and integrating those into an overall
impression, and to worry about making errors in this.”
To test their involvement hypothesis, Maheswaran and
Meyers-Levy (1990) conducted a 2 × 2 experiment in which
college students were given information on cholesterol
screening. Involvement was manipulated by telling subjects
either (1) that heart disease can affect people 20 to 29 years
of age (high involvement) or (2) that heart disease affects
only the elderly (low involvement). Next, subjects were given
cholesterol-screening messages, which were either gain
framed (stressing the health benefits of screening) or loss
framed (stressing the health risks of not being screened). As
hypothesized, loss frames were more persuasive among high-
involvement subjects. Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990,
p. 366) concluded “that negatively framed appeals can be
highly persuasive … only if individuals who receive the
appeal are sufficiently involved with the issue.” In addition,
the experiment indicated that among low-involvement sub-
jects, gain framing was more persuasive than loss framing. In
interpreting this finding, the authors posited that, though sub-
jects who scrutinize gain-framed messages judge them to be
weak arguments, less involved subjects simply view them as
positive peripheral cues, which enhances persuasion among
these subjects (see Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).
Subsequent experiments have replicated the finding that
loss-framed messages are more persuasive among message-
involved subjects, though they have tended to find no effect
of framing under low-involvement conditions. Rothman and
colleagues (1993) examine how the effectiveness of alterna-
tively framed messages to promote skin cancer screening is
moderated by involvement. However, instead of manipulat-
ing involvement, the authors use subjects’ sex as a surrogate
for involvement. Citing evidence that “women as compared
to men were more concerned about sun tanning and skin
cancer and, therefore, were considered more involved with
the health issue,” they conclude that sex “was a reasonable
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1These two categories of health behavior are defined as follows:
Prevention (sometimes called “primary prevention”) behaviors
reduce the probability that a person will contract a disease. For
example, in the context of HIV infection, the practice of “safe sex”
(e.g., through the use of condoms) would be considered preventive
behavior, because it reduces the probability that a person will
become infected with HIV. In contrast, detection (sometimes called
“secondary prevention”) behaviors do not affect the chance of con-
tracting a disease but simply enable a person to learn whether he or
she has already contracted it. For example, getting a blood test for
the presence of HIV would be considered a detection behavior;
being tested for HIV does not reduce the probability of getting the
infection, but it may allow for earlier and more effective treatment.
proxy for degree of issue involvement” (Rothman et al.
1993, p. 421). As predicted, loss-framed messages were
more effective among women, whereas framing had little
effect on men. Rothman and colleagues (1993, p. 420) con-
clude that “exposure to negatively framed information led
women to be even more likely … to intend to obtain a skin
exam.”
Finally, Block and Keller (1995) examined the framing–
involvement interaction, manipulating involvement by altering
the perceived effectiveness of the target behavior. Gleicher and
Petty (1992) found that when subjects were assured that a pro-
tective behavior was effective, they were less likely to scruti-
nize the subsequent arguments that support this behavior (per-
haps fearing that such scrutiny would weaken their confidence
in the protective behavior) than when they were told that the
behavior’s effectiveness was doubtful. On the basis of this
research, Block and Keller (1995) hypothesized that messages
advocating low-efficacy health behaviors would elicit greater
message involvement than messages advocating high-efficacy
behaviors, and therefore loss-framed messages would be more
persuasive for low-efficacy behaviors. They tested these
hypotheses in two experiments, the first involving a sexually
transmitted disease and the second involving skin cancer. In
both experiments, subjects in the low-efficacy conditions
exhibited greater message involvement/processing, and among
such subjects loss framing induced more favorable attitudes
and intentions than did gain framing. However, among sub-
jects exposed to the less involving (high-efficacy) message,
framing had no effect. On the basis of these experimental
results, Block and Keller (1995, p. 192) concluded that “when
subjects process [messages] in-depth, negative frames are
more persuasive than positive ones.”
Behavior Type as a Moderator of Framing
In a recent review article on framing effects and consumer
health behavior, Rothman and Salovey (1997) acknowledge
that message involvement might play a role in moderating
such effects. However, they suggest that an additional mod-
erator might be at least as important as involvement: the type
of health behavior being promoted. Rothman and Salovey
note that in studies involving prevention behaviors (such as
using sunscreen or infant car seats), gain-framed advocacies
were often more persuasive than loss-framed behaviors.
However, in studies involving disease-detection behaviors
(such as screening for cancer or heart disease), loss framing
is typically more persuasive.1
In interpreting this difference, Rothman and Salovey
(1997) argue the following:
1. The relative effectiveness of gain and loss frames depends on
how well each frame matches subjects’ prior perceptions
about the target behavior; in other words, “we must consider
how framed information is integrated into prior perceptions”
(p. 9).
2. Consumers tend to view detection behaviors in a negative
light and thus are less receptive to messages that stress the
benefits of these behaviors than to messages that stress the
even greater risks/costs of failing to engage in these behav-
iors. Rothman and Salovey argue persuasively that con-
sumers tend to perceive disease-screening behaviors as
inherently unpleasant; some of the unpleasantness is fairly
certain (e.g., cost, discomfort, embarrassment, inconve-
nience), whereas other aspects are less certain (e.g., the pos-
sibility of bad news about the patient’s health).
3. Therefore, the best way to position screening is as the lesser
of two evils—that is, to point out the even greater unpleas-
antness that can result from not screening and hope that in
this context, consumers will view getting screened as the
“least bad” option. This is what a loss-framed message does.
A gain-framed message, in contrast, tries to motivate screen-
ing by stressing its benefits. According to Rothman and
Salovey, this positioning runs counter to consumers’ pre-
dominantly negative attitudes toward disease-detection
behaviors. Therefore, a gain-framed screening advocacy is
likely not to be persuasive.
The Potential for Boomerang Effects
Thus, Rothman and Salovey (1997) conclude that among
message-involved subjects, gain-framed messages will be less
persuasive than loss-framed messages. However, they do not
pursue another implication of their reasoning, which has not
been investigated in any previous study either: If gain-framed
messages conflict with consumer perceptions of disease-
detection behaviors, perhaps such messages are not only
unpersuasive but counterpersuasive—that is, perhaps gain-
framed messages create a boomerang effect, shifting con-
sumer attitudes in the opposite direction from that intended by
the advocacy. Similar to Rothman and Salovey (1997), Petty
and Cacioppo (1981, p. 225) observe that when audiences
“relate information in the message [to] pre-existing knowl-
edge about the topic, ... they may either agree or disagree with
the message.” However, Petty and Cacioppo (1981, p. 225) go
on to note that subjects’ “antagonistic ... responses may be so
much more persuasive than the arguments contained in the
message that a position opposite to that advocated might be
adopted.”
Such boomerang effects have been discovered in a vari-
ety of persuasive contexts, including exposure to messages
that are highly discrepant from subjects’ prior attitudes (Dig-
nan et al. 1985; Whittaker 1968), reactance against perceived
strong persuasive intent (Snyder and Wicklund 1976), state-
ments of facts already presumed to be true (Gruenfeld and
Wyer 1992), and presentation of extremely counterstereo-
typical examples (Kunda and Oleson 1997). In addition, Sut-
ton, Balch, and Lefebvre (1995) have speculated that efforts
to educate consumers about cancer risk factors can some-
times decrease consumers’ motivation to undergo cancer
screening. However, no previous study has examined the
potential role of a boomerang in message framing effects.
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The present study is explicitly designed to search for
boomerang effects. In addition to the treatment groups
exposed to framed messages, the experiment includes a con-
trol group that was not exposed to any message. This
enables us to determine whether gain-framed messages are
merely less persuasive than loss-framed messages or
whether gain-framed messages produce more negative atti-
tudes toward the advocated behavior. As noted previously,
several studies have found that involved subjects who are
exposed to a loss-framed message have more positive atti-
tudes toward the target behavior than involved subjects who
are exposed to a gain-framed message, and researchers have
attributed this difference to a proadvocacy attitude change
created by the loss-framed message. Of the framing experi-
ments discussed previously, only Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s
(1987) included a control group. These authors did not eval-
uate the possibility of a boomerang effect for gain-framed
messages. However, an examination of their cell means
reveals that compared with control subjects who saw no
framed message, subjects exposed to a gain-framed message
had more negative responses to the target behavior on three
of the five dependent measures. Meyerowitz and Chaiken do
not provide sufficient information to test for the statistical
significance of these differences (and because n = 79, the
power of such tests would be low). Nonetheless, their find-
ings suggest the possibility of a boomerang effect for gain-
framed messages.
Hypotheses
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we hypothesize the
following consumer responses to messages advocating
screening behaviors:
H1: Among subjects exposed to (low-involvement) statistical
messages, framing will have little effect on attitudes and
beliefs toward the target behavior.
H2: Among subjects exposed to the (high-involvement) anec-
dotal messages, gain framing will be less persuasive than
loss framing. Compared with loss-framed messages, gain-
framed messages will (a) be perceived as having less infor-
mational value, (b) be perceived as less persuasive (i.e.,
less likely to influence subjects’ future behavior), (c) elicit
more negative beliefs toward the detection behavior, and
(d) elicit more negative attitudes toward the detection
behavior.
H3: Anecdotal/gain messages will create a boomerang effect.
Compared with control subjects who are not exposed to
any advocacy, subjects who are exposed to anecdotal/gain
messages will (a) have more negative beliefs toward the
detection behavior and (b) have more negative attitudes
toward the detection behavior.
Method
Target Behavior and Population
We tested our hypotheses in the context of a specific screen-
ing behavior: mammography. Breast cancer is one of the
leading causes of death among women, causing about
44,000 deaths annually in the United States alone (Roberts
1996). One of the most effective ways to reduce breast can-
cer deaths is to encourage women to have regular screening
mammograms. Among women older than 50 years of age,
clinical trials indicate that screening mammography can
reduce the mortality rate of this disease by 30%–50%
(Reynolds and Jackson 1991). However, despite the proce-
dure’s benefits, many women either do not have mammo-
grams at all or have them less often than is recommended by
the medical experts. For example, only about 25% of
Medicare recipients follow the National Cancer Institute
recommendation to have annual mammograms (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 1995a). Research indicates
that attitudinal factors, including ambivalence about poten-
tial test outcomes, play a central role in women’s failure to
get mammograms (for a review, see Fuller et al. 1992).
Experimental Design
The study employed a 2 (statistical or anecdotal evidence) ×
2 (gain versus loss framing) between-subjects experimental
design with a control group. Control subjects were given the
same procedure and questionnaire as treatment subjects but
saw no experimental advertisement. Each of 174 subjects
was assigned randomly to one of the five experimental con-
ditions: 117 to one of the four treatment conditions, and 57
to the no-advertisement control condition.
Subjects
A total of 174 women over the age of 50 years were recruited
from social and volunteer organizations in a Midwestern
metropolitan area. As noted previously, women over 50 are
the primary target for annual mammograms. To encourage
participation, organizations received $1 per subject and a
chance to win $250 in a lottery. Subjects’ ages ranged from
51 to 89 years, with a mean of 70. Subjects were 67% white,
27% married (23% divorced, 39% widowed, 10% never
married, 1% other), and 90% high school graduates, and
81% reported “good” or “excellent” health. Thirty-six sub-
jects reported that a family member had had breast cancer.
Compared with U.S. population averages for women over
age 50, women in our sample had slightly greater levels of
self-reported health and education and were considerably less
likely to be currently married (see Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention 1999). Therefore, caution should be used
in generalizing our findings to all women over age 50. How-
ever, analysis of our data indicated that subjects’ attitudes
toward mammography and breast cancer and their responses
to the experimental messages did not differ according to their
self-reported health status, education, or marital status.
Experimental Stimuli
The stimuli were four black-and-white advertisements. Each
had the headline “Why ShouldYou Get a Mammogram?” and
contained the same basic information on breast cancer and
mammography, which was drawn from health education
materials produced by the National Cancer Institute and the
American Cancer Society. All advertisements provided a tele-
phone number “For information on where to obtain a screen-
ing mammogram near you” and a picture of a telephone.
However, the advertisements differed in the type of evi-
dence used (statistical or anecdotal) and whether the conse-
quences of mammography were framed in terms of gains or
losses. Specific statistics were based on the clinical research
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2These are equivalent because, for example, a .007 risk is 30%
less than a .01 risk, but a .01 risk is 43% greater than a .007 risk.
The 43% change in the statistical loss message may sound more
dramatic than the 30% change in the statistical gain message,
despite their mathematical equivalence. However, as we show, the
two messages did not elicit significantly different attitudes toward
screening mammography.
finding that annual screening mammograms reduce a
woman’s chance of breast cancer death by 30%–50%. The
statistical gain message used the more conservative figure: a
30% reduction in risk if a woman has a mammogram. The
statistical loss message stated the equivalent risk increase: a
43% increase in risk if a woman fails to have a mammo-
gram.2 Initial versions of the messages were developed,
pretested for ease of comprehension with ten women over 50,
and revised. This resulted in the following four messages:
1. Statistical, gain: “Many women have no family history of
breast cancer and have never felt any lump in their breast.
But they follow the advice of the American Cancer Society
and start having annual screening mammograms when they
turn fifty. Because of this, doctors are able to detect their
tumors at an early, treatable stage, and they are 30% less
likely to die of breast cancer.”
2. Statistical, loss: “Many women have no family history of
breast cancer and have never felt any lump in their breast. So
they don’t follow the advice of the American Cancer Soci-
ety to start having annual screening mammograms when
they turn fifty. Because of this, doctors are not able to detect
tumors at an early, treatable stage, and they are 43% more
likely to die of breast cancer.”
3. Anecdotal, gain: “No one in Sara Johnson’s family had ever
gotten breast cancer, and she had never felt any lump in her
breast. But she followed the advice of the American Cancer
Society and started having annual screening mammograms
when she turned fifty. Because of this, doctors were able to
detect her breast tumor at an early, treatable stage, and now
Sara can look forward to a long life, watching her grandson,
Jeffrey, grow up.”
4. Anecdotal, loss: “No one in Sara Johnson’s family had ever
gotten breast cancer, and she had never felt any lump in her
breast. So she didn’t follow the advice of the American Can-
cer Society to start having annual screening mammograms
when she turned fifty. Because of this, doctors were not able
to detect her breast tumor at an early, treatable stage, and
now Sara may miss out on a long life, watching her grand-
son, Jeffrey, grow up.”
Subjects received a booklet containing four black-and-
white advertisements: a randomly assigned mammography
advertisement and three dummy advertisements (for vita-
mins, soap, and insurance); the latter were the same for all
groups. The treatment advertisement was always the second
advertisement in the booklet. The control subjects did not
see a mammography advertisement; in its place was a fourth
dummy advertisement.
Manipulation and Confounding Checks
To verify that the anecdotal messages were more involving
than the statistical messages, we conducted a pretest. We
recruited 96 women over the age of 50 years (none of whom
participated in the main experiment) from local organiza-
tions. Each subject viewed one (randomly assigned) mes-
sage for 30 seconds and then reported agreement with six
statements: “I got involved in what the ad had to say,” “The
ad’s message seemed relevant to me,” “This ad really made
me think,” “This ad was thought-provoking,” “The mammo-
gram ad was very interesting,” and “I felt strong emotions
while reading this ad.” These six items formed a summed
scale with a coefficient alpha of .96. Analysis confirmed that
the anecdotal messages were significantly more involving
(mean = 33.52) than the statistical messages (mean = 25.11;
t = 6.81, p < .001).
Rothman and Salovey (1997) suggest that framing
effects are moderated not only by involvement but also by
the perceived risk of the behavior that is being promoted.
Therefore, it was important to establish that subjects in the
two evidence conditions did not differ in their perceptions of
the risk in getting a mammogram. Toward this end, we con-
ducted a second pretest. We recruited 65 women over the
age of 50 years (none of whom participated in either the pre-
vious pretest or the main study) from local organizations.
Each subject viewed one of the (randomly assigned) target
messages for 30 seconds and then reported her agreement
(on a seven-point scale) with five statements: “Getting a
mammogram is risky,” “Mammograms can lead to bad
results,” “Mammograms have uncertain outcomes,” “Get-
ting a mammogram makes me feel anxious,” and “Getting a
mammogram would cause me to worry.” (These statements
were based on Rothman and Salovey’s [1997] and Dowling
and Staelin’s [1994] conceptualizations of perceived risk.)
The five items formed a summed scale with coefficient
alpha of .77. Perceptions of behavioral risk did not differ
between subjects exposed to anecdotal messages (mean =
12.5) and subjects exposed to statistical messages (mean =
11.97; t = .33, p = .75).
Procedure
We randomly distributed booklets among groups of women
at each participating organization. (Such organizations are
frequently the setting for the presentation of health-related
information to older adults; see, e.g., List et al. 1999.) While
pretesting the materials, we had found that some women in
this age group had difficulty completing scales. We made
several modifications to the questionnaire to help facilitate
this process. First, we used a 13-point type size to increase
readability. Second, the experimental procedure began with a
warm-up exercise in which subjects completed Likert scales
for statements about a local retailer, which were unrelated to
the study topic. When the warm-up exercise was completed
and subjects indicated that they understood how to complete
numerical scales, the experiment began. All subjects (both
treatment and control) received identical instructions:
We are interested in your thoughts about some health topics
and about some advertisements for mature women focusing
on those health topics. In a moment, you will be asked to
view four proposed advertisements. We will give you about
30 seconds to look at each ad carefully. Please do NOT look
back at any ad after the examiner says STOP. Directly behind
these ads is a questionnaire…. Due to the limited time, we
will be asking different questions to different people.
No mention of breast cancer or mammograms was made
before ad exposure. After ad exposure, subjects completed
the questionnaire. Consistent with the cover story (that the
96 / Journal of Marketing, July 2001
study focused on “health topics,” and “we will be asking dif-
ferent questions to different people”), all questionnaires
stated, “You have been chosen to answer questions about
mammograms (breast cancer screening x-rays) and other
health behaviors concerning breast cancer.”
Measures
Beliefs about target behavior. Subjects reported agree-
ment (on a seven-point Likert scale) with 16 belief state-
ments about breast cancer and mammography. These health
belief items were adapted from prior studies of mammogra-
phy behavior (Stein et al. 1992). The 16 items were entered
into a principal components analysis by means of a varimax
rotation, which produced four interpretable, orthogonal fac-
tors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The first factor was
labeled “mammography benefits” (e.g., mammography can
detect a tumor when your doctor can’t, mammography is
effective in early detection of breast cancer, breast cancer
can be cured if detected early). The second factor repre-
sented “mammography barriers” (e.g., mammograms are
embarrassing, inconvenient, painful, cost too much). The
third factor represented “perceived susceptibility to breast
cancer” (e.g., more likely than average to get breast cancer,
get breast cancer sometime in life). The fourth factor was
labeled “risk factor knowledge” (e.g., can develop breast
cancer without symptoms, can develop breast cancer with-
out a family history of breast cancer).
Evaluation of the advertisement. Subjects rated the infor-
mational value of the mammogram advertisement on eight
semantic differential scales (believable/not believable, real-
istic/not realistic, factual/not factual, good/bad, useful/not
useful, appropriate/not appropriate, helpful/not helpful, and
educational/not educational). These items were combined to
form a summed scale with a coefficient alpha of .74.
In addition, each subject assessed the likelihood that the
advertisement would influence her behavior. Subjects were
asked, “If you saw this advertisement in a magazine, how
likely would you be to go and get a screening breast mam-
mogram?” Finally, subjects’ overall attitude toward screen-
ing mammography was assessed by asking them to express
their agreement or disagreement with the statement, “I think
women my age should have a yearly mammogram.”
Results
Effects of Framing Within Anecdotal Versus
Statistical Messages
Our first analyses examined whether the impact of framing
on subjects’ beliefs and attitudes varied depending on the
type of evidence (statistical versus anecdotal) in the mes-
sage. We conducted 2 × 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs),
in which the factors were evidence (statistical versus anec-
dotal) and framing (gain versus loss). The dependent vari-
ables included subjects’ evaluations of the advertisement’s
informational value, perceived behavioral influence of the
advertisement, beliefs about the target behavior and disease
(benefits, barriers, susceptibility, and risk factor knowl-
edge), and overall attitude toward the target behavior. Cell
means from these ANOVAs are presented in Table 1.
Effects on advertisement evaluations. Neither framing
nor evidence had a main effect on subjects’ evaluations of the
advertisement’s informational value. However, there was a
significant interaction between framing and evidence
(F(1,87) = 10.08, p = .002). To test our hypotheses regarding
this interaction, we analyzed the simple effects of framing
within each of the two evidence conditions (see, e.g., Keppel
1982, pp. 214–19). As hypothesized, loss-framed informa-
tion was evaluated as having significantly more informational
value among subjects who were exposed to the (more involv-
ing) anecdotal messages (F(1,87) = 10.45, p < .01), whereas
framing had no significant effect among subjects who were
exposed to the statistical messages (F(1,88) = 2.51, N.S.).
Effects on predicted behavior. Framing and evidence
also had an interactive effect on subjects’ predictions of their
own mammography behavior (F(1,103) = 10.87, p = .001).
TABLE 1
Experimental Cell Means
No-
Gain- Loss- Gain- Loss- Advertisement
Dependent Measuresa Framed Framed Framed Framed Control
Perceived informational value of advertisement 5.55 5.23 5.10b 6.07 N.A.
Perceived likelihood of having a mammogram, 
after seeing advertisement 5.48 4.37 4.07b 5.54 N.A.
Overall attitude toward mammography for women 
older than 50 years 6.38 6.17 5.28b, c 6.71 6.14
Perceived barriers to mammography –.17 .18 .34b –.44 –.11
Perceived susceptibility to breast cancer .10 –.10 –.34c –.11 .23
Perceived benefits of mammography –.28 –.08 –.10 –.11 .03
Risk factor knowledge –.20 –.10 .09 .01 .10
aHigher numbers indicate higher perceived informational value of advertisement, greater perceived likelihood of getting a mammogram, more
positive attitude toward mammography, higher perceived barriers and benefits to mammography, greater perceived susceptibility to breast can-
cer, and greater risk factor knowledge.
bThe difference between anecdotal, gain-framed and anecdotal, loss-framed messages is statistically significant at p < .01.
cThe difference between anecdotal, gain-framed message and no-message control is statistically significant at p < .05.
Statistical
Advertisements
Anecdotal
Advertisements
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As hypothesized, loss framing was more persuasive among
subjects who were exposed to the anecdotal presentation 
(F(1,103) = 7.57, p < .01). Within a statistical presentation,
the subjects who were exposed to the gain message had a
slightly higher mean, but this effect was not significant at
p < .05 (F(1,103) = 3.77, p = .06).
Effects on overall attitude toward screening mammogra-
phy. The analysis also revealed a significant interaction of
framing and evidence type on subjects’ overall attitude
toward the target behavior (F(1,108) = 7.19, p = .008).
Within anecdotal messages, loss framing produced more
positive attitudes toward the target behavior (F(1,108) =
11.14, p < .01). Within statistical messages, framing had no
effect on mammogram attitudes (F(1,108) = .23, N.S.).
Effects on mammogram beliefs. There were no effects of
evidence or framing on subjects’ beliefs about their suscep-
tibility to breast cancer, the perceived benefits of mammog-
raphy, or risk factor knowledge. However, there was an
interactive effect of framing and evidence on perceptions of
the mammogram barriers (F(1,104) = 8.92, p = .004). In
anecdotal messages, loss framing produced lower perceived
barriers to mammography (F(1,104) = 8.65, p < .01). In sta-
tistical messages, framing had no significant effect
(F(1,104) = 1.69, N.S.).
Mediation Analysis
Thus, among subjects exposed to the high-involvement anec-
dotal messages, loss frames were significantly more effec-
tive than gain frames. To help interpret these findings, we
conducted mediation analysis. This analysis followed James
and Brett’s (1984): If the effects of an antecedent (A) on an
outcome (O) are completely mediated by a third variable
(M), the three simple correlations (rao, ram, and rmo) should
be statistically significant, but the correlation between the
antecedent and the outcome should become nonsignificant
when the mediator is controlled (i.e., rao.m = N.S.).
We tested several mediational models, including one in
which the impact of framing on predicted behavior was
mediated by beliefs and attitudes toward the behavior:
framing ⇒ perceived barriers ⇒ attitude ⇒ predicted 
behavioral response
However, although each of the successive simple correlations
implied by this model is statistically significant (e.g.,
rframing.barriers, rbarriers.attitude, rattitude.intention), the model does
not stand up to mediational analysis. For example, the corre-
lation between framing and predicted behavior remains sig-
nificant, even after perceived barriers and attitude are con-
trolled for. This indicates that the impact of framing on
predicted behavior is not mediated by attitudes or perceived
barriers.
In addition, when framing is controlled for, the correla-
tion between attitude and predicted behavior becomes non-
significant. According to Pedhazur (1982), this result sug-
gests that framing either (1) mediates a causal relationship
between attitude and predicted behavior or (2) jointly (and
independently) influences both attitude and predicted
behavior. Since framing was randomly manipulated, it is
exogenous and cannot possibly mediate the relationship
between two measured variables. Therefore, the remaining
plausible explanation is the second: Framing jointly and
independently influences both attitude toward the target
behavior and predicted behavioral response to the advertise-
ment; that is,
framing ⇒ attitude
⇓
predicted behavioral response
Further analysis indicates that the impact of framing on
attitudes is completely mediated by beliefs about barriers to
the target behavior. Consistent with James and Brett’s
(1984) criteria, all three simple correlations are statistically
significant (rframe,attitude = .37, p < .01; rframe,barriers = –.38,
p < .01; rbarriers,attitude = –.41, p < .01), but the impact of
framing on mammogram attitudes becomes nonsignificant
when perceived mammogram barriers are controlled
(rframe,attitude.barriers = .22, p = .117).
The mediation analysis also suggests that the effect of
framing on predicted behavioral response is mediated by
evaluations of the advertisement’s informational value. All
three simple correlations are significant (rframe,behav = .34,
p = .011; rframe,adeval = .44, p = .004; radeval,behav = .58, p <
.001), but the effect of framing on predicted behavior
becomes nonsignificant when advertisement evaluation is
controlled (rframe,behav.adeval = .23, p = .131).
Comparing the Treatment Groups with the Control
Group
As noted previously, when prior studies have found more
positive attitudes among subjects who were exposed to loss-
framed (versus gain-framed) messages, they have tended to
conclude that the loss-framed messages elicited proadvo-
cacy attitude change. However, in the absence of a no-
message control group, such findings are open to another
interpretation: that gain-framed messages cause counter-
advocacy attitude change. To examine this issue, our exper-
iment included a no-message control group.
We compared the attitudes and beliefs of subjects who
were exposed to the four framed advocacy messages with
the control subjects, who saw no advocacy at all. Table 1
shows the control and treatment groups’ beliefs and attitudes
toward mammography and breast cancer. Measures that
referred specifically to the mammogram advertisement (e.g.,
advertisement evaluation) obviously were not applicable to
the control group. We made significance tests using Dun-
nett’s table of critical values for comparing treatment and
control groups, where k (the total number of groups) equals
5 (see Winer, Brown, and Michels 1991, pp. 462, 977–78).
The control group comparisons produced several inter-
esting findings. They revealed that the mammography atti-
tudes and beliefs of subjects who were exposed to the low-
involvement statistical advertisements were not significantly
different from those of subjects who saw no mammogram
message at all (all t-statistics less than 1). Thus, our findings
not only suggest that framing has little effect on low-
involvement subjects (as Block and Keller [1995] and Roth-
man et al. [1993] find) but also support Taylor and Thomp-
son’s (1982) finding that subjects tend not to rely on
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statistical information when making judgments (see also
Brosius and Bathelt 1994; Hogarth 1980).
Consistent with prior theory (e.g., Maheswaran and
Meyers-Levy 1990; Wright and Weitz 1977), control-group
comparisons suggest that highly involving framed informa-
tion influenced subjects’ attitudes and beliefs about the
advocated behavior. However, the pattern of this influence
departed somewhat from that predicted in prior framing
research. As we hypothesized, subjects who were exposed to
a highly involving gain-framed message had substantially
more negative attitudes and beliefs toward mammography
than subjects who were exposed to no message at all.
Indeed, the counteradvocacy effects of the gain-framed mes-
sage appear to be stronger than any proadvocacy effects of
the loss-framed message. Women exposed to the anecdo-
tal/gain message had significantly less favorable overall atti-
tudes toward mammography than the control subjects did
(t = 2.26, p < .05) and were significantly more likely to deny
their susceptibility to breast cancer than the no-advertise-
ment controls (t = 2.48, p < .025). In addition, the anecdo-
tal/gain subjects seemed to perceive greater mammogram
barriers than the no-advertisement controls, though this dif-
ference (t = 1.88) did not reach statistical significance at the
.05 level, according to the fairly conservative Dunnett test.
Although subjects exposed to the anecdotal/loss message
had higher mean attitudes toward mammography (t = –1.48)
and lower perceived barriers to getting a mammogram (t =
1.43), these effects were weaker than the counteradvocacy
effects of the gain message, and none of the loss/control
comparisons reached statistical significance. Therefore, it is
not clear that the loss message created proadvocacy attitude
change, as prior framing researchers suggest. However, the
gain messages created counteradvocacy attitude change.
Depth Interviews
To aid further in the interpretation of the experimental find-
ings, we conducted depth interviews among members of the
target audience. The use of depth interviews to interpret exper-
imental findings dates back at least to Merton and Kendall’s
(1946) classic article on the focused interview. These authors
note (p. 542) that “The primary purpose of the focused inter-
view was to provide some basis for interpreting statistically
significant effects of mass communication” in experimental
studies. In particular, they advocate the use of depth interviews
“to locate the source of ... ‘boomerang effects’ in film, radio,
pamphlet and cartoon propaganda” (see also Gorden 1980).
Fourteen women, ranging in age from about 50 to 80
years, were recruited to participate in individual depth inter-
views. None of these women had participated in the original
experiment. Each subject was asked to examine each adver-
tisement (anecdotal gain-framed and anecdotal loss-framed)
for approximately 30 seconds and then report any “thoughts
or feelings” she had while reading that advertisement (see
Merton and Kendall 1946, p. 550). The order of advertise-
ment presentation was varied from one interview to the next.
After subjects had reported their reactions to each advertise-
ment, they were asked to report their feelings and experi-
ences regarding mammography. Subjects’ comments were
audiotaped, professionally transcribed, and then organized
according to recurring themes (see Leydon et al. 2000;
Ritchie and Spencer 1994).
Responses to the gain-framed message. As might be
expected, many subjects reported positive emotions after
reading the upbeat, gain-framed messages. For example,
“[I feel] happy. You felt positive after reading it, ... just a
positive message.”
“It is positive and hopeful ... because she can look forward
to a long life.”
“[I]t has a happy ending.”
“[I]t is giving her hope.”
“[I]t’s warm inside and everything is wonderful.”
“It makes me feel better already.”
“[It] leads you to hope that things work out better. A posi-
tive outlook.”
For many products, such positive feelings would be likely
to enhance the persuasive power of an advertisement (see
Monahan 1995). However, the elicitation of positive feelings
is likely to have two effects that reduce subjects’ motivation
to use a disease-screening product. First, the elicitation of
positive feelings may give subjects a false confidence that
they are not vulnerable to the disease. Forest and colleagues
(1979, p. 161) find that “People who are feeling good may
exaggerate their sense of control over the environment and
may feel less vulnerable.” Consistent with this, the subjects
in our experiment who were exposed to the anecdotal, gain-
framed message perceived themselves to be significantly less
susceptible to breast cancer (p < .025) than did the control
subjects. In addition, several interviewees reported that the
gain-framed message, though pleasant, was almost too reas-
suring—that it did not create a sense of urgency to get a
mammogram and even fostered a sense of complacency:
“It doesn’t do anything to create a sense of urgency….
Again, going back to the sense of urgency. Unless I have
something that I’m concerned about, why go through it?
… Squashing your breasts….”
“[I]t’s not a threat. And if you are not concerned about it,
you are not going to accept that threat as your own.”
“[T]here might be some women that the positive one
would not have touched.”
“[S]he never felt a lump, so she didn’t see any reason to do
anything. And so in that case, you know, if it’s not broke,
don’t fix it.”
“Well, I would probably think, well you know that is really
something that I need to do, but maybe I’ll do it next week.”
“I would probably never stop and look at this message
because I would think ‘oh, I know.’”
“It didn’t have the same emotional impact as [the loss-
framed message].”
Second, the elicitation of positive feelings can make
subjects less willing to engage in a task they perceive to be
unpleasant. For example, both Forest and colleagues (1979)
and Isen and Simmonds (1978) find that though elicitation
of positive feelings generally makes subjects more likely to
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engage in helping tasks, there is a notable exception: The
elicitation of positive feelings makes subjects less likely to
engage in a helping task that they perceive to be unpleasant.
Forest and colleagues (1979, p. 168) conclude that “persons
who are feeling good are concerned about preserving their
mood and will avoid activities that they expect would
destroy their good feelings.” Citing this research, Monahan
(1995, p. 93) speculates that “If people are generally nega-
tively disposed to an idea (say, wearing a condom), inducing
positive affect … may cause recipients of the message to
denigrate the idea even further.” Women clearly perceive
mammography to be an “unpleasant task.” When asked to
discuss the procedure, subjects gave long and eloquent lita-
nies of its short-term costs, including pain, expense, incon-
venience, embarrassment, and fear.
“The fear of it maybe being painful.... [Y]ou get caught up
in everyday life and you just don’t do the things you should.”
“[I]t is uncomfortable…. [I]f you’ve never done it before
it is real scary…. [Y]ou don’t know what is going to hap-
pen in there…. [T]hat’s real scary, … just the idea that a
stranger is going to have you lay your [breast] up [on] a
plate and squash it…. [B]efore I had my first one, I was
really frightened of what it was going to be like, … that
and the expense if [you] don’t have insurance.”
“A lot of insurance doesn’t pay for them…. If I didn’t under-
stand the reason for them, I wouldn’t get them either because
they hurt…. A man had to have designed that machine….
[J]ust the denial kind of thing. Some women just don’t want
to know. If I pretend it’s not there, it will go away.”
“They are uncomfortable…. And there are so many jokes
about it [i.e., the pain]…. I think, ... am I somehow increas-
ing my chances, you know, x-rays, radiation? … [Y]ou can
never do it, at least not through my health plan.You can’t do
it at the same time you make your doctor’s appointment.
And so they give you a sheet and tell you to come back any
time, but then there is like a line. I’m busy and I don’t do it.”
“[Women] are fearful of it,… especially some women who
don’t go to the doctor regularly are fearful of just what it
entails, the procedure itself. And [some] people who are
afraid because they think they do have something and so
it’s better not to know you have something.”
“I think [women] hear that it hurts. They think it costs a lot
of money for people who don’t have access to it easily….
[I]ts not easy to get a mammogram actually…. I just think
it’s denial and inaccessibility and cost. And convenience.
And it does hurt.”
“I think in general women don’t [take] care of their health
for themselves as much as for their family members. They
are busy with work and looking after everybody else, and
they put themselves last. That’s the reason. Lack of infor-
mation about what goes on in a mammogram. And there is
some fear that it might be painful.”
“The pain…. You have to take time out of your day to go
to the out clinic and get it all taken care of. Insurance does-
n’t cover it like it does other things.”
“They hurt, … [and] it is a scheduling issue…. [J]ust
working it into your time and schedule, and you are look-
ing at a time in women’s lives when they are raising kids
and working…. You don’t have time to breathe. Much less,
schedule a pancake squeeze.”
“I think the cost. Just other stories that they have heard
about, that they hurt, … and some could even be embar-
rassed to have to go in to get a mammogram…. [Y]ou’re
supposed to go in yearly, and you get too busy and forget.”
Responses to the loss-framed message. Subjects’ reac-
tions to the loss-framed message were, in many ways, the
reverse of their responses to the gain-framed message.
Whereas the gain-framed advertisement elicited positive
feelings, the loss-framed message tended to elicit negative
emotions, especially fear.
“This one is more scary.... I guess this one would be like if
you wanted to scare somebody, this one would probably
do it.”
“Ooh, ... it’s depressing. You know, they were not able to
detect and Sara may miss out on a long life, watching her
grandson. And that’s just depressing. I was thinking, you
know, she could. If you don’t catch breast cancer, the
chances are it gets into the bone.”
“I’m scared when I read this one.”
“That one is scary and I don’t want to deal with it.”
However, despite (or perhaps because of) the negative
emotions elicited by the loss-framed message, many women
found it compelling, especially in motivating an otherwise
reluctant woman to take action:
“Some people would have to have something … hit them
in the face before they do anything about it.”
“[T]he fear of something happening I think maybe gets
your attention and makes you start thinking that maybe
this is something I need to do.”
“This one is like, wow, should they do it and look at all the
negative things that are happening because she didn’t do it.”
“[H]ow important it is to follow the advice to get a mam-
mogram because she didn’t and now she’s not going to see
her grandson grow up, and telling you ... the risk patients are
not following the advice…. I would take it just a little more
to heart because it’s telling that she did not see her grandson
grow up and telling you, you know, well when the other one
said she did so things worked OK, then this one shows
things are not OK so you might tend to go along with it.”
“That hit home a little more because ... she didn’t get to see
him grow up.”
“My reaction is how sad that she is not going to see her
grandson…. How important mammograms are.”
“The person would miss out on a lot of her life because she
didn’t go get a mammogram…. They’re fearful. And this
kind of plays along with that.”
“[T]his could happen to you too. You know, if you think
about it this could happen to you if you don’t get your
mammogram.”
“This [would affect people] because it seems more likely
that Sara will die. And I think we all are afraid of death....
I guess I’ll take care of it now.”
“[I]t has a little more shock value to it. I guess it maybe
draws you up a little shorter. You know, if you figure you
are not going to watch your grandson grow up, that kind of
thing might catch my attention more than something that
says everything is fine.”
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“I think it’s a fear that a woman has of having breast can-
cer and having this example where she is missing out on
family life. It just strikes you more than a happy life that
turned out OK.”
“[S]omething could have been prevented that wasn’t
because she didn’t have the checkup. And the consequence
is terrible. So, it just seems the consequence from that … is
more striking than the good consequence of getting it…. I
think the fear factor is working…. But I’ve known women
who died of breast cancer, so maybe I can relate to that one.”
“Because it’s scary. It gives the idea that this can happen to
you.”
“That one hurts more. That one strikes home. You know,
the thought of missing things in life…. That’s what really
struck me on that one…. Because that is more of a real
threat. The idea that, OK, I have a lump, maybe I can get
it treated. There is no sense of urgency in that. But … if
you are going to miss something ... that makes it much
more real.”
Discussion
Although early-detection behaviors offer great potential
benefits, consumers are often reluctant to engage in them.
As a consequence, communication campaigns promoting
these behaviors often meet with limited success. Our
research examines how the persuasiveness of early-detec-
tion advocacies is affected by two message design factors:
whether the consequences of screening are communicated
through anecdotal or statistical evidence and whether these
consequences are framed in terms of potential losses or
potential gains.
As hypothesized, the effects of framing were moderated
by the type of evidence employed in the persuasive mes-
sages. Among subjects exposed to the low-involvement sta-
tistical messages, framing had no significant attitudinal
effect. However, among subjects exposed to high-involve-
ment anecdotal messages, gain framing (compared with loss
framing) elicited significantly more negative evaluations of
both the advertisement and the advocated behavior. To this
point, our findings are consistent with those of prior studies
(e.g., Block and Keller 1995; Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy
1990; Wright 1981).
However, our experiment also produced some novel
findings that may shed new light on the interpretation of
message framing effects. When prior researchers have found
that subjects exposed to loss-framed messages had more
positive attitudes than subjects exposed to gain-framed mes-
sages, they have attributed this difference to proadvocacy
attitude change created by the loss-framed messages. How-
ever, our experiment, employing a no-message control
group, suggests a different interpretation. When we com-
pared the attitudes and beliefs of our treatment groups with
those of our control group, the results indicated that at least
some of the effect of framing occurred because the anecdo-
tal, gain-framed message had a negative effect on women’s
attitudes toward mammography. These data suggest that
some framing effects may be due to a boomerang effect of
the gain-framed message.
Why does this boomerang effect occur? Our data (from
both the experiment and the depth interviews) show that
consumers perceive screening to have many short-term neg-
ative consequences, and their perceptions of these negative
consequences mediate the effects of framing on consumers’
attitudes toward screening. Gain-framed messages are
viewed as providing relatively weak arguments for getting
screened, and these arguments do not provide consumers
with a sufficient justification for enduring the short-term
costs of the target behavior. In contrast, loss-framed mes-
sages are viewed as providing a more powerful argument for
why consumers should endure the short-term discomfort of
being screened.
Many health communicators favor gain-framed mes-
sages because they believe that such messages create a pos-
itive emotional response among the target audience (Backer,
Rogers, and Sapory 1992; Monahan 1995). Consistent with
this view, our interview subjects reported that the gain-
framed message evoked pleasant emotions, including happi-
ness and hopefulness. Ironically, however, the pleasantness
of gain-framed messages may be one source of their weak-
ness in promoting early detection. Previous research (e.g.,
Forest et al. 1979; Isen and Simmonds 1978) has found that
after exposure to pleasant stimuli, subjects tend to perceive
themselves to be less vulnerable and are less willing to
engage in behaviors they perceive to be unpleasant. Consis-
tent with this, subjects in our experiment who were exposed
to the upbeat, gain-framed anecdotal message had both sig-
nificantly more optimistic perceptions of their chances of
getting breast cancer and significantly more negative atti-
tudes toward getting a mammogram than did control sub-
jects exposed to no mammogram message.
How do our findings compare with the “conventional
wisdom” among designers of health communication cam-
paigns? Backer, Rogers, and Sapory (1992) find that the
majority of health communicators strongly favor the use of
positive (gain-framed) messages. In summarizing these
views, Backer, Rogers, and Sapory (1992, p. 30) state that
health campaigns “are more effective if they emphasize pos-
itive behavior change rather than the negative consequences
of current behavior. Arousing fear is rarely successful as a
campaign strategy…. Campaigns are more effective if they
emphasize current rewards rather than the avoidance of dis-
tant negative consequences.”
Several of Backer, Rogers, and Sapory’s (1992) respon-
dents expressed concern that negatively framed appeals cre-
ate a boomerang effect, reducing compliance with the mes-
sage. For example, one respondent stated, “Unless fear
appeals are done very cleverly, the evidence suggests that a
negative reaction will be produced. The audience tends to
discount the message or to behave counter to the message or
simply to deny the message” (Backer, Rogers, and Sapory
1992, p. 54). In contrast, none of Backer, Rogers, and
Sapory’s respondents discussed circumstances under which
gain-framed messages might be ineffective, much less cause
a boomerang.
Further evidence regarding health marketers’ attitudes
toward gain versus loss framing can be obtained by examin-
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ing the promotional materials they produce. We collected
and content-analyzed 15 widely distributed promotional
pieces that were designed to promote disease screening.
These pieces encompassed several behaviors (including
screening for breast cancer, colon cancer, and cervical can-
cer), sponsors (National Cancer Institute, American Cancer
Society, a state health department, and a drug industry
group), and media (print advertisements, pamphlets, media
releases, Web sites, and slide shows). Of the 15 pieces, 14
contained only gain-framed arguments, and 1 included a
combination of gain- and loss-framed arguments. Of 39 total
framed statements, 37 were gain-framed, and 2 were loss-
framed. Four of the messages were anecdotes about specific
women who had gotten breast cancer, and all were gain-
framed: Because of early detection, each of these women
can look forward to healthy, productive lives.
Why do gain-framed arguments tend to dominate such
campaigns? According to Latour and colleagues (Latour and
Rotfeld 1997; Latour, Snipes, and Bliss 1996), there is a
widespread wariness of negatively framed messages among
marketing communication professionals, stemming, at least
in part, from a misreading of the “fear appeal” literature.
Although the modal finding of 50 years of research is that
fear appeals are generally effective (see Hale and Dillard
1995; Latour and Rotfeld 1997; Petty and Cacioppo 1981),
the one experiment every communication professional
seems to remember (the “mainstay of textbooks,” according
to Latour and Rotfield 1997) is Janis and Feshbach’s 1953
experiment, in which the ineffectiveness of a message that
showed the dire consequences of poor dental care was attrib-
uted to “defensive avoidance.” Among campaign designers
afraid of such potential backlash to negative appeals, gain-
framed appeals are apparently viewed as the safe alternative.
Areas for Further Research
Further research could build on the present study in several
ways. First, it would be interesting to examine the long-term
effects of evidence type and framing on consumer attitudes
toward early detection, as well as their effects on actual
screening behavior. Such behavioral follow-up would be
somewhat challenging for mammograms, which are gener-
ally given (at most) annually or semiannually; however, it
might be more feasible for screening behaviors that are per-
formed more frequently (see Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987).
Second, further research should examine the effects of
message framing in increasingly naturalistic settings. For
example, rather than provide subjects with a single forced
exposure to a framed message, future experimenters should
consider embedding framed messages unobtrusively among
other media content to which consumers are exposed (e.g., a
magazine, television program) as well as examining how
repeated exposure may moderate the effects of framing (see
Eagly and Chaiken 1993, pp. 286–87).
In addition, further research should continue to explore
how framing effects are influenced by consumers’ prior per-
ceptions of the behavior being promoted. Of particular
interest is the distinction, stressed by Rothman and Salovey
(1997), between health behaviors aimed at detection versus
prevention. Rothman and Salovey argue that consumers
view detection behaviors in terms of their negative short-
term consequences; therefore, they are especially receptive
to loss-framed messages that advocate such behaviors. Our
findings support that position. Our subjects associated mam-
mography with a variety of unpleasant consequences (dis-
comfort, inconvenience, embarrassment, and fear) that are
shared by many screening behaviors, including tests for can-
cers of the colon, cervix, and prostate and HIV infection. In
addition, our data indicated that the effect of message fram-
ing on attitudes toward the target behavior was mediated by
consumers’ perceptions of these negative consequences.
However, Rothman and Salovey’s (1997) statements
regarding prevention behaviors seem more debatable. They
argue that consumers perceive prevention behaviors as hav-
ing few negative consequences, and therefore consumers are
more receptive to gain-framed appeals for these behaviors.
For example, Rothman and Salovey (1997, p. 9) state that “In
contrast to detection behaviors, the salient function of a pre-
ventive behavior is to provide a relatively certain, desirable
outcome.” But is this statement valid? The specific preven-
tion studies Rothman and Salovey review focus on innocuous
behaviors with few negative short-term consequences (e.g.,
using sunscreen or infant car seats). However, there are other
prevention behaviors that consumers perceive as having sub-
stantial short-term costs. For example, many elderly people
avoid having annual flu shots because they are afraid that the
shot will hurt or make them sick (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention 1995b). Similarly, many women at risk of
HIV infection fear the short-term consequences (especially
the reactions of their partners) of insisting on the use of a
condom (see, e.g., Darroch and Frost 1999). Further research
should examine the relative effectiveness of loss- versus
gain-framed messages in motivating prevention behaviors
(e.g., vaccination, condom use, smoking cessation) that con-
sumers perceive to entail significant short-term sacrifice.
Finally, further research should examine the extent to
which the phenomena observed in this study apply not only
to health-related behaviors but also to a much broader range
of consumer behaviors. There are many situations in which
consumers must decide whether to endure relatively certain
immediate costs to avoid uncertain (but much more severe)
future costs. For example, consumers may face this type of
avoidance–avoidance conflict when deciding whether to
purchase life or disability insurance or whether to perform
expensive preventive home maintenance. In promoting such
behaviors, should marketers employ the kind of gain-framed
messages (e.g., “Thank God, Bill had life insurance”) gen-
erally favored by marketing communicators (see LaTour and
Rotfeld 1997), or is it possible that such messages are too
reassuring to be effective? This would be a worthwhile
avenue for further research.
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